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THE LEGAL BASIS FOR MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXES IN
MICHIGAN

Arthur M. Wisehart*

I. Introduction

W

RITERS

in the field of municipal administration, as well as

local officials, constantly and consistently tell us that the

cities need more money. Is it true?1 The answer to this question
would seem to depend on the response of the electorate in a given
municipality to the case made for the proposition by their city officials.
To establish the validity of the contention that the cities need more
money is not an objective of this article. Assuming the validity of
this contention, however, the problem then becomes one of finding
ways to increase municipal revenue.
The local real property tax is the leading source of income for
cities at the present time, and it is capable of still greater productivity.2
Although legal limitations may stand in the way of increasing property tax rates, the same result can be obtained by increasing the assessed valuation of property. This is possible since full value assessments in the United States are practically nonexistent. 3
Aside from possible legal limitations, many municipalities are
"" Assistant Editor, MicmGAN LAw R.Evmw. Part of the research for this article was
completed while the author was a research assistant in the Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 Although a given city either may or may not need more revenue, the proposition
that cities in general do not have enough revenue to meet their expenditures is not difficult
to justify. "While the· total spending of State and local governments has increased at a
slower rate from 1950 to 1951 than the growth in receipts, the general situation can be
characterized as one of inadequate revenue." U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FEDERALSTATE-LocAL TAX CooRDINATION 2 (1952). From 1942 to and including 1951, total local
tax revenue increased only 86.4%, while state tax revenue increased 128.9% and federal
tax revenue increased 275.2% in the same period. Taxes on all levels of government rose
205.7% in the period from 1942 to 1951 inclusive. This figure does not reHect changes in
governmental revenue from other sources such as business activities, contributions, and
investment earnings. During the same period the national income rose 102%. U.S. BURBAu
oF THE CENsus, GOVERNMENT REVENUE IN 1951, Table II, p. 9 (1952).
2 ''Local governments, • • • relying heavily on the property tax, have not benefited
proportionately from the high level of economic activity." This is explained by the fact
that the property tax, although a relatively stable source of revenue, is not as sensitive to
changes in the economic cycle as are most other tax sources of revenue. Reasons given for
this are (1) the valuation of property at substantially less than market value, (2) the lag
between changing economic conditions and the corresponding adjustments in assessments,
and (3) the failure to anticipate increased inflationary demands for revenue. The stability
of the property tax is helpful to local governments in times of economic recession, but it
occasions difficulty in inflationary periods. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FEDERAL-STATELoCAL TAX CooRDINATION 2 (1952).
s "The average adjusted rate decreased from $24.93 per thousand in 1950 to $23.65
in 1951-a drop of 5.1 per cent. Since the adjusted rate is computed by multiplying the
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reluctant to add to the property tax burden, for they believe that
direct economic participation in local governmental activities should
not discriminate on the basis of the ownership of real property alone.
Property owners themselves are inclined to feel that a diversification
of the.local tax base is long overdue.4 In such a situation, a municipality may tum to the comparatively recent nonproperty taxes. 5
Nonproperty taxes may be classified into the "substantial revenue"
and "nuisance" categories. The "nuisance" type is used to fill that
"extra amount" which may be needed to balance a city's budget,6
while the "substantial revenue" taxes are levied more in accord with
a long term fiscal program of tax diversification, capital improvement,
and reduction of municipal indebtedness.
Chief in terms of revenue producing ability among taxes of the
latter classification is the municipal income tax. It produced amounts
of from-50 to 70 percent of the revenue of the property tax for the
cities levying it in 1951.7 Chief in terms of utilization by municipalities is the municipal sales tax which was used by 92 cities in the
same year. 8
unadjusted or actual rate by the ratio of assessed value to current market value, the 1951
decrease indicates that assessed valuations have failed to increase along with the current
upward trend of market values." Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "Tax Rates of
American Cities," 41 NAT. MUN. RBv. 18 (1952).
4 ''For the country as a whole, real estate still accounts for almost 90 cents of every
dollar of local tax revenue." Ecker-Racz, "Intergovernmental Tax Coordination: Record
and Prospect," 5 NAT. TAX J. 245 at 249 (1952).
5 For the best general discussion of nonproperty taxes, see Hillhouse and others,
WHERE CiTIEs GET THEm MONEY (1945, with 1947, 1949, and 1951 supplements).
6 See Wisehart, "The Admissions Tax as a Source of Revenue for Michigan Municipalities," UNIVERSITY OF MicmGAN BUREAU OF GoVERNMENT lNsTITIJTE OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, PA.PERS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (No. 10) (1954).
7 Thirty-four states and 24 cities of over 10,000 population utilized personal income
taxes in 1951. Municipal income taxes customarily are imposed at a rate of 1%. It is
estimated that a 1% income tax would yield $17.51 per capita for cities over 500,000
population. In 1950 the tax yielded a total of $65,632,500 in revenue for the 24 cities
imposing it. The jurisdictions in which municipalities levy income taxes are Kentucky,
Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. The economic effect of
municipal income taxes generally is described as roughly proportionate. This proportionality is considered desirable since other local taxes have a regressive economic effect when
measured in terms of personal income. Because they are imposed on nomesidents earning
income within the city limits in addition to being imposed on residents, municipal income
taxes have been found to facilitate movements for the annexation of outlying urban districts. Such taxes have been criticized because of the difficulties encountered in the
municipal administration of them. They also are quite sensitive to change in the economic
cycle. The characteristic last mentioned is an advantage from the standpoint of a taxpayer
but a disadvantage from the standpoint of a municipality which relies too heavily on the
revenue expectations of its income tax. For a discussion of the municipal income tax in
terms of revenue produced, present utilization, and administrative operation, see Wisehart,
"The Income Tax as a Source of Revenue for Michigan Municipalities," UNIVERSITY OF
MicmGAN BUREAU OF GoVERNMENT INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PAPERS IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (No. 10) (1954).
8 Hn.LHousE, WHERE Crmis GET THEm MONEY 15 (1951 Supp.).
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The purpose of this article is to explore the legal difficulties
which might beset a Michigan municipality attempting to impose an
income tax. Because of the similarity of some of these difficulties to
those encountered in other jurisdictions, it is hoped that this study
will be useful outside of as well as within the state of Michigan.

II. The Saginaw Tax
Saginaw is the only Michigan city which has attempted to impose
a municipal income tax. On May 22, 1951, the city council asked
the voters the following question:
"Shall section 45 of chapter 7 of the city charter be amended:
To authorize a tax levy on property of not to exceed l %; to
authorize for IO years only an excise tax of not more than l %
on salaries, wages, commissions, other compensation and profits
of both residents and nonresidents; and to provide for the use
of the net proceeds of such excise tax to reduce property taxes,
defray . annual sewage bond expense, and for public improvements?"9
On the advice of the attorney general that the city did not have
authority to levy this tax, the governor refused to approve the proposed amendment. Notwithstanding the governor's disapproval, the
required two-thirds of the council10 favored sending the proposition
before the voters, and the amendment was passed by a vote of 9,030
to 5,432.11
The tax was to go into effect on January 1, 1952. Before this
date, however, an action was brought to enjoin the city from levying
the tax. Plaintiffs contended that the tax was invalid both because
of the form of the charter amendment proposed and because of the
character of the tax itself. Circuit Judge Boardman granted the
injunction.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the injunction decree on
the procedural ground that the form of the charter amendment was
invalid. The proposed amendment was said to contain three separate propositions-CI) a IO mill limitation on the property tax,
(2) a municipal income tax, and (3) a disposition of tax revenue
9 This provision is set out in House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241 at 245,
54 N.W. (2d) 314 (1952).
lO As this requirement was met by the exact number necessary, one of the subsequent
controversies centered on the qualification of one of the council members to vote on the
question because of his interest in the real estate business and consequent desire for low
property taxes to increase real estate values.
11 Tharp, ''The City of Saginaw Adopts an Income Tax,'' 24 M:rca. MUN. REv. 99
(1951).
-
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-without affording the electors the opportunity to vote for or against
each proposition separately, as is required by Michigan law.12 Judge
Dethmers termed the tax limitation proposition as nothing more than
"attractive bait to win approval of the income tax."13 From a legal
standpoint, the Michigan Supreme Court decision constitutes a rather
strict interpretation of the statute referred to above, but perhaps a
justi:6.able result in terms of the express wording of this enactment.14
The failure of the Saginaw tax on procedural grounds leaves the
substantive legal questions challenging the municipal income tax
in Michigan unanswered. It is for this reason that these substantive
legal problems are considered in this article.
The tax on earned income proposed in Saginaw is typical of
the kind that any other city in Michigan might desire to impose.
It is similar to the income taxes levied by most other cities, contains
most, not all, of the provisions about which controversy has arisen,
and has been considered on its merits in one Michigan court.15
Since the injunction granted by the circuit court was based upon
questions of substantive law posed by the tax rather than on the
procedural grounds of the supreme court's affirmance, the opinion
of Judge Boardman and the arguments of the plaintiffs in their briefs
before the supreme court are sources of some of the principal contentions made against the tax.
Plaintiffs House and Corson, members of the UAW-CIO, brought
the equity action in their own behalf and in behalf of the membership of the union. Interests claimed to be represented in this action
included those of residents of the city subject to the tax, nonresidents
working in the city who could not vote on the proposed charter
amendment, shareholders in corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and representatives of units of local governments interested in
tax revenue (such as nearby school districts).
"In the opinion of the Court, the basic question involved in the
entire litigation is the question of whether a home-rule municipality
in this state has the power to impose a tax, such as the one here in
question, under the existing general law and the state constitution."16
12 "Any proposed amendment shall be con£ned to l subject and in case a subject
should embrace more than l related proposition, each proposition shall be separately stated
to afford an opportunity for an elector to vote for or against each such proposition." Mich.
Comp. Laws (1948) §ll7.2I.
13 House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241 at 248, 54 N.W. (2d) 314 (1952).
14 See note, 51 MICH. L. REv. 609 (1953).
15 House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241, Record on Appeal from the Circuit
Court of the County of Saginaw (Chancery), No. 45441, p. 104 (December 28, 1951).
1e Id. at 89.
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The circuit court took the view that municipalities are creatures
of the state, exercising only those powers expressly delegated to them,
or necessarily implied therefrom. Taxation, especially, is a power
attributable to sovereignty which must be specifically delegated since
only the state may exercise sovereign powers.17 In the opinion of
the court, the constitutional provision specifying that "The legislature shall provide by a general law for the incorporation of cities
18
• • ."
assumes the non-existence of organic powers in Michigan municipalities and should be compared with similar provisions in the
Missouri Constitution.
Deciding that Saginaw, a home rule city, had no organic power
on which it could rely to levy the tax, the court then turned to the
question of whether the home rule act:1 9 delegated the city power
to accomplish the same result. This brought up the question of
whether the income tax, termed a "specific excise" in the ordinance20
as well as in the charter amendment proposal, was an excise tax
within the meaning of the "permissible" provision in the home rule
act. 21
In answering this question, the court quoted from divergent definitions of "excise," said that the inclusion of income tax within
the meaning of this word was the broad view, and emphasized the
rule that tax laws are to be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer. It found that "virtually without exception, an excise tax has
been judicially determined to be an indirect tax," 22 whereas an income tax, relying on the decision in the Pollock case,23 is a direct tax.
The court concluded that an income tax cannot be an excise, and
therefore could find no express legislative authorization for such a
tax. Accordingly, the charter amendment and the ordinance were
declared invalid.
The court further expressed doubt as to whether the state legislature could authorize the cities to levy such a tax since, in its
opinion, it is dubious whether the state itself could impose an income
tax. This conclusion is based upon (1) conB.icting opinions of the
attorney general and (2) the failure of a constitutional amendment
authorizing a state income tax on four different occasions (in 1922,
11 Id. at 103.
1s Mich. Const., art. VIII. §20.
19 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) c. 117.
20 Saginaw Ordinances, §102.I.
21 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §117.4(i).
22 House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich.

241, Record on Appeal from the Circuit
Court of the County of Saginaw (Chancery), No. 45441, p. 90 (December 28, 1951).
23 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912 (1895).
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1924, 1934, and 1936).24 The state intangibles tax. was distinguished
from an income tax by calling it a specific tax measured by income.
The court pointed out that if an income tax is considered to be a tax
on property, a constitutional question of uniformity ·arises. 25
In the opinion of the court, the "mandatory" home rule charter
provision to the effect that the "subjects of taxation for municipal
purposes shall be the same as for state, county, and school purposes
under the general law" should be applied to the municipal income
tax. Since income as a tax subject had not be(;!n authorized for
state, county, and school purposes under general law, the cities could
not utilize this tax subject.26

III.

Municipal Power in Michigan-Before 1908

A development of the historical and judicial context in which
present constitutional and statutory provisions relating to municipal
powers were framed is a desirable aid in the interpretation of what powers a Michigan municipality may exercise today. It therefore seems
proper to inquire into what powers were exercised by municipalities
in Michigan before the constitutional change in 1908 and to compare with them (I) the purposes sought to be accomplished by the
change and (2) the powers that have been exercised since that time.
From what sources are municipal powers derived? The traditional answer to this question is that municipalities are agencies of
the state and exercise only those powers delegated to them by the
state. The delegated powers commonly are grouped into four classifications: (I) expressly delegated powers, (2) powers necessarily
implied from those expressly granted, (3) inherent powers, and (4)
powers implied from the declared objects and purposes of the municipality.21
Express grants of power to municipalities are found in state
constitutions, statutes, and municipal charters. "A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise all powers granted in express
terms, so far as consistent with the United States Constitution, treaties and laws, and the state constitutiop. and the general laws of the
state."28
24House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241, Record on Appeal from the Circuit
Court of the County of Saginaw (Chancery), No. 45441, p. 102 (December 28, 1951).
25 Mich. Const., art. X, §3.
26 House and Corson v. Saginaw, 334 Mich. 241. Record on Appeal from the Circuit
Court of the County of Saginaw (Chancery), No. 45441, pp. 104-105 (December 28,
1951).
212 McQOILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS, 3d ed., §10.09 (1949).
2s Id., §10.10.
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Only some of the states recognize the doctrine of inherent municipal powers. Even where it is accepted, the doctrine is difficult
to pin down in terms of definition. "There is some authority for
defining inherent powers as those necessary to the existence and due
functioning of a municipal corporation. . . ." 29 The inherent powers
doctrine can be used both as a limitation on state legislative interference with municipal affairs and as an affirmative source of power
for municipalities. In Michigan the inherent powers doctrine has
been limited, in the main, to use as a restriction on the power of the
state rather than an affirmative source of municipal power. Some
of the cases subsequently cited illustrate such a use.
Implied powers are those powers (1) necessary to the exercise of
those expressly granted and (2) indispensable to the purposes of the
municipal corporation.30 These are determined according to rules
of constitutional and statutory interpretation and with some reference
to powers customarily exercised by municipalities.
The Michigan court was a leader in asserting that there is an
inherent right to lo~al self-government possessed by municipalities.
This right found its most positive assertion as a limitation on the
power of the state in Judge Cooley's concurring opinion in People
31
11. Hurlbut.
In the Hurlbut case the court held that provisional
appointments to the Detroit Board of Public Works by the state
legislature were valid. But, by way of dictum, Judge Cooley addressed himself to the question of "whether local self-government in
this state is or is not a mere privilege, conceded by the legislature in
its discretion, and which may be withdrawn at any time at pleasure?"32 In answering this question, Judge Cooley wrote:
"The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative
power by the constitution there can be found authority thus to
take from the people the management of their local concerns,
and the choice, directly or indirectly, of their local officers, if
practically asserted, would be somewhat startling to our people.
. . . We have taken great pains to surround the life, liberty,
and property of the individual with guaranties, but we have
not, as a general thing, guarded local government with similar
protections. We must assume either an intention that the legislative control should be constant and absolute, or, on the other
hand, that there are certain fundamental principles in our gen29 Id., §10.11.
so Id., §10.12.
Sl 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103 (1871). Cf. Hawkins v. Grand Rapids, 192 Mich.
276, 158 N.W. 953 (1916).
s2 24 Mich. 44 at 96 (1871).
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eral framework of government, which are within the contemplation of the people when they agree upon the written charter,
subject to which the delegations of authority to the several
departments of government have been made. That this last is
the case, appears to me too plain for serious controversy."33
Judge Cooley noted, "these corporations are of a twofold character; the one public as regards the state at large; in so far as they
are its agents in government; the other private, in so far as they are
to provide the local necessities and conveniences for their own citizens." This public-private analysis has been used as a test in subsequent cases to help determine (I) whether the state could interfere
with municipal operations and (2) whether a given exercise of municipal power was valid in the absence of express authority by the
state.
The dictum of the Hurlbut case was followed in other Michigan
cases. In Board of Park Commissioners 11. Common Council of
Detroit,34 the court refused to mandamus the common council to
appropriate funds for the acquisition of a park area by the Board
pursuant to an enabling act by the state legislature. Judge Cooley
characterized this as within the area of private concern of the municipality, and said the state could permit but not compel the exercise
of power. The power of the legislature to prescribe duties for municipal officers was said to be limited in order to give meaning to
the constitutional guarantee of local self-government.35 The subsequent case of Attorney General 11. Common Council of Detroit3 6
was distinguished from the preceding cases on the ground that it
concerned the local division of powers rather than usurpation of
local powers by the state.
The power of the state to impose excise taxes in the absence
of specific constitutional authority was declared at an early date. 37
The Walcott case involved the yalidity of a gross receipts tax imposed
on express companies as a condition precedent to the granting of the
privilege to do business in the state. The Constitution of 1850
expressly authorized certain types of excises and provided that other
taxes should be uniform. The court refused to find a negative
implication in the constitutional provisions prohibiting the tax in
33 Id.

at 97.
Mich. 228 (1873).
35 Cf. Board of Park Commissioners v. Mayor of Detroit, 29 Mich. 343 (1874); Allor
v. Wayne County Auditors, 43 Mich. 76, 4 N.W. 492 (1880).
36 29 Mich. 108 (1874).
37 Walcott v. The People, 17 Mich. 68 (1868).
34 28
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question. It said that power to levy such a state tax was inherent
in the constitution, and added that it is difficult to believe that the
people of Michigan would create a government without providing
adequate sources of support
The supreme court held that municipal corporations also had
implied power to levy excises.38 The Kitson case involved the validity of an occupational excise imposed on saloon keepers by the
City of Ann Arbor. The court held that this levy was a valid
exercise of the polic~ power even though the license fee was of a
substantial amount and yielded revenue. The case turned on the
uniformity and cash value clauses of the Constitution of 1850, and
the court held they did not apply to the excise tax in question,
following the authority of the Walcott case.
The philosophy underlying these cases was drawn together by
Judge Cooley in Youngblood 11. Sexton.89 That case involved the
imposition by the state of a flat rate excise tax on liquor dealers. The
tax was to be collected by county sheriffs for the benefit of the cities,
towns, and villages wherein the liquor businesses were carried on.
The action was to enjoin the collection of the tax. In this case
there is no question of authority, the pivotal question being whether
this tax was valid in light of the constitutional provision that the
proceeds of state specific taxes must be paid into the primary school

fund.
Judge Cooley first observed that equity did not have jurisdiction
to grant an injunction because of the adequacy of the legal remedy,
but he went on to decide the other questions because of the public
interest involved. Since this was a local tax levied for a local use
(but by the state), he said that it did not come within the scope of
the constitutional provisions relating to state specific taxes. (This
would seem to answer the contention that municipal income taxes
cannot be authorized by the state if the state itself cannot levy income
taxes.)
Judge Cooley added more dictum on the matter of authority. He
referred to the distinction he had made in the Hurlbut case between
the public and private powers of a municipal corporation, and classified taxation, along with police power,40 as a matter of general public
concem.41 Noting that it was decided in the Walcott case that the
38 Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325 (1873).
39 32 Mich. 406 (1875).
40 See People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481 at 497 (1865).
41 This generally is the view taken in other jurisdictions.

v. St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. (2d) 438 (1947).

See Carter Carburetor Corp.
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state might enact new specific taxes and in the Kitson case that local
excises were aµthorized, Judge Cooley went on to say, "All taxation
must be authorized by the state...." He added, however, that "we
know of no reason why all taxation for the ordinary purposes of government may not be levied under general laws when no express provision of the constitution forbids it."42
In the absence of home rule, municipalities traditionally have
been considered agencies of the state, exercising only the powers expressly or impliedly delegated to them. This doctrine was not accepted
without qualification in Michigan. By his dictum in the Hurlbut
case, Judge Cooley showed a disinclination to follow the fiction that
states were created prior to cities and that the cities therefore derived
their powers from the state. Since the cities could be proved to be
in actual existence before the states had been formed, he argued
that the constitution of the state should be interpreted to take cognizance of this historical fact rather than strictly construed against
the powers "delegated" to municipalities.
The second qualification upon the "agency of the state" interpretation in Michigan has been the recognition of inherent powers
ascribable to municipalities. The inherent power doctrine was used
in a line of cases as a limitation upon the power of the state to
interfere with the activities of municipalities, and was limited to
private activities of municipalities as distinguished from those having
a more general import. Police power and municipal taxation both
expressly were designated as matters of general concern for which
state interference was permitted and state authority for municipal
activity was required. In regard, however, to state authority for
taxation, a broad interpretation was given, the court indicating that
taxes for the ordinary purposes of government might be levied under
general laws when they are not forbidden by express constitutional
provisions.

IV. The Michigan Constitutional Change (1908)
Having surveyed briefly the power of Michigan municipalities
before 1908, we now shall tum to a consideration of the constitution adopted in 1908 and its influence upon municipal powers.
Article XV, section 13 of the 1850 Constitution provided that
"The legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization
of cities and villages, and shall restrict their powers of taxation, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit [emphasis
42 Id.

at 414.
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supplied]." Section 14 of the same article was a further elaboration
of the scheme of legislative control. It provided that "Judicial officers
of cities and villages shall be elected and all other officers shall be
elected or appointed at such time and in such manner as the legis1ature may direct. "
The general features of these provisions were carried over by
the Constitution of 1908 in article VIII, section 20. "The legislature
shall provide by a general law for the incorporation of cities, and by
a general law for the incorporation of villages; such general laws
shall limit their rate of taxation for municipal purposes, and restrict
their powers of borrowing money and contracting debts [emphasis
supplied]."
The first point of similarity to note in these provisions is that
words of direction are used. In each case it is stated clearly that
the legislature "shall provide" for the establishment of municipal corporations and for their organization. In each constitution it also
was deemed _important to direct that the legislature either restrict or
limit municipal fiscal powers.
Despite the similarities in the directions given by the people
speaking through their constitution to the legislature, however, there
are significant differences in the language of the constitutional change.
The 1908 Constitution requires that the legislative provisions pertaining to municipalities be by general law. Nothing is said in this
regard in the 1850 Constitution.
In the 1850 Constitution it is provided expressly that the legislature must restrict the power of taxation of municipal corporation,
whereas nothing is said in the 1908 Constitution about limiting the
municipal tax power. It says only that the rate of taxation for municipal purposes shall be limited by the legislature. Because of this
difference in the language used, it would seem reasonable to suppose
that the framers of the 1908 Constitution did not think it necessary
to require the legislature to restrict municipal tax powers, apparently
feeling that the legislature was competent to make adequate provisions itself in this matter of general concern.
Article IV, section 38 of the Constitution _of 1850 provided that
the "legislature may confer upon . . . incorporated cities . . . such
powers of a local, legislative and administrative character as they may
deem proper [emphasis supplied]." This section, discretionary on
the part of the legislature as distinguished from the mandatory provisions set out in the preceding paragraph, seems to indicate that
the constitutional intent was to vest in the legislature complete control over municipal powers in the sense that municipalities could
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be considered not only as agencies of the state, but also as agencies
of the state legislature. Under this scheme of 1850 it is apparent
that municipalities could exercise only those powers expressly or
impliedly delegated to them by the legislature, and, in addition,
perhaps, those inherent in the nature of municipal corporations or
units of local government in existence at the time the constitution
was formulated. Note the change in the language found in article
VIII, section 21 of the 1908 Constitution:
"Under such general laws the electors of each city and village
[rather than the members of the legislature] shall have power
and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to
amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted
or passed by the legislature for the government of the city or
village [Emphasis supplied. The immediately preceding italicized
words were added by amendment in 1912 to make it clear that
cities operating under legislative charters also_ were to have home
rule powers. MrcmGAN SENATE JouRNAL, Extra Session, 1912,
Second Session, p. 89] and, through its regularly constituted
authority, to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal
concerns, subject to the Constitution and general laws of the
state."

A comparison of these provisions in the 1850 and the 1908 constitutions demonstrates clearly an intent on the part of the people
of the state to shift the locus of power relating to the activities of
municipal corporations. Both constitutions directed the legislature
to provide for the incorporation of municipalities. But, once that
was done, the Constitution of 1850 indicated that the municipalities
should exercise only those powers delegated from the legislature,
whereas the Constitution of 1908 shifted power to the municipalities
by providing that the electors of each city, incorporated under the
general laws of the state and acting through its regularly constituted
authority, should have power (I) to frame, adopt and amend its
charter and (2) to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns.
This change is demonstrated further by the fact that the 1850
Constitution saw :6.t to direct that the legislature restrict the power
of municipal taxation whereas the 1908 Constitution provided only
that the legislature should limit the rate of municipal taxation, saying
nothing about the power. This is another illustration that the
new constitutional provisions (1908) contemplated a change in the
locus of municipal power from the state and in the direction of the
municipalities. Recognizing, however, that the state still had an

1954]

MUNICIPAL INCOME TAXES

693

interest in the general property tax, and that both the state and local
units would continue to use it, the 1908 Constitution directed that
the legislature limit the rates of that tax which the municipalities
might levy in order that there be some measure of tax coordination
between state and local units of government. It does not appear from
this language that the constitution was intended to limit the power
of the electorate of municipalities to impose upon themselves nonproperty taxes in which the state, by its failure to legislate on the
matter, had demonstrated no interest whatever.
The purpose of these provisions of the Constitution of 1908 was
explained by Mr. Lawton T. Hemans, of Ingham County, before the
committee of the whole of the constitutional convention on January
16, 1908:
'We have here departed from what has been the rule in
many of the state Constitutions, for we have left to the legislature
the broad powers of framing what those general principles and
fundamental ideas should be. We have not followed the Constitution of Minnesota or the other states which have placed all
that great mass of legislation in their Constitution, but we have
said that it should be under the general law enacted by the legislature, we have confined the provision to the parts that should
be embraced in a Constitution, leaving the legislature to work
out the details that belong to it."43
The question then arises as to whether these constitutional provisions are self-executing-whether they can be given effect in and
of themselves-or whether they require legislation to put them into
effect. "Generally, constitutional provisions as to taxation are not
self-executing."44 This rule seems especially applicable to the constitutional provisions under consideration, for they expressly require
that the "legislature shall provide by general law" and that "under
such general laws" the home rule powers are to be exercised.45 A
provision of the constitution is not self-executing where its language
plainly indicates that the subject-matter is referred to the legislature
for action. 46
The procedural guide for a Michigan municipality seeking to
levy a tax, therefore, is not in the constitution itself, but in the general
law enacted by the legislature.
48 Michigan Constitutional Convention, PROCEBDINGS AND DBBAT.Ss, vol. 2, p. 809
(1907).
441 CooLBY, TAXATION, 4th ed., §132 (1924).
45 See Bay City v. State Board of Tax Administration, 292 Mich. 241, 290 N.W. 395
(1940).
46 1 McQan.LAN, MONicIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §321 (1949).
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V. Home Rule in Michigan
Two types of home rule generally are recognized-legislative and
constitutional. Although derived from constitutional authority, the
general structure of home rule in Michigan was outlined by the
legislature in the home rule act of 1909.47 As indicated above, the
home rule sections of the Michigan Constitution are not selfexecuting.48
Although home rule in Michigan is legislative in character, a
question arises as to whether the home rule act should be interpreted
as grants of power from the legislature to municipalities traditionally
are interpreted, or whether the fact that it was enacted under constitutional direction has a bearing on the interpretation to be given
it. The Michigan Supreme Court, in a case decided soon after the
passage of the home rule act, commented:
"The act was passed in obedience to a mandate of section
20, Article VIII, of the Constitution. . . . The new system
is one of general grant of rights and powers, subject only to
certain enumerated restrictions, instead of the former method of
only granting enumerated rights and powers definitely speci:6ed."49
The court in subsequent cases followed this reasoning, and held
that the constitutional provisions and the home rule act were to be
construed together,50 that "it was sought fundamentally to place in
the hands of the electors of the cities chartered thereunder increased
power of governmental control,"51 that the home rule charter constitutes the organic law of the city and is to be treated as other organic
acts are treated,52 that the distinction between local functions and
those performed by a municipality as an agent of the state should be
preserved,53 and that the provision for a general Jaw for the incorporation of municipalities was intended to confer upon them almost
exclusive rights in the conduct of their affairs when the exercise of
such rights are not in conflict with the constitution or the general
laws applicable thereto. 54 From these decisions, the conclusion that
47 Mich. Pub. Acts (1909),
48 Gallup v. Saginaw, 170

Act 279, p. 497.
Mich. 195, 135 N.W. 1060 (1912); Bay City v. State
Board of Tax Administration, 292 Mich. 241, 290 N.W. 395 (1940). It has been stated,
however, that the words of the constitution made it mandatory on the legislature to pass
such legislation. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W. (2d) 193 (1945).
49 Gallup v. Saginaw, 170 Mich. 195 at 199-200, 135 N.W. 1060 (1912).
50 Streat v. Vermilya, 268 Mich. 1, 255 N.W. 604 (1934).
51 School District of Pontiac v. Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338, 247 N.W. 474 (1933).
52 Streat v. Vermilya, 268 Mich. 1, 255 N.W. 604 (1934).
63 Attorney General ex rel. Lennane v. Detroit, 225 Mich. 631 (1923).
54 "The purpose of these and other provisions which follow undoubtedly was to secure
to cities and villages a greater degree of home rule than they formerly possessed. The
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municipal powers in general should be construed more broadly than
they were before the Constitution of 1908 seems a safe one.
The general rule has been that the scope of tax laws is not to be
extended by implication or forced construction. When the power
granted is dubious, it is to be construed strictly and in favor of the
taxpayer. 55 It has been said that "The mischief of a strict construction is easily obviated by the legislature; but the mischief of a liberal
construction may be irremedial before it can be reached."56 However, the same author also pointed out that "Strict construction does
not mean such a construction so as to defeat the intention of the
legislature. Where there is really no ambiguity, the rule that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer does not, of course,
apply."57
Do these rules of interpretation apply to tax powers conferred by
a legislature under a constitutional mandate to provide home rule
to municipalities? The answer to this question, it is fair to say, is
not clear. The power to tax has been called the "highest prerogative of
sovereignty."58 In a Michigan school district tax case the court quoted
with approval the following statement from an opinion involving
a state tax: "The presumption of constitutionality following taxing
statutes is stronger than applies to laws generally. . . ." 59 This
would seem to indicate its belief that local taxes are to be tested by
the same standards that are applicable to state taxes.
Does this presumption applicable to state taxes also apply to municipalities levying taxes under home rule powers required to be
formulated for them by the state constitution? Or, to put the question in another way, does article VIII, section 21 of the Michigan
Constitution invest municipalities with their own tax sovereignty
when acting in conformance with the constitution and general laws
of the state? If we are to accept the statement of the Streat case,
that home rule charters are to be considered organic acts, our answer
to this question should be in the affirmative. If not considered grants
of organic power, of what significance are the provisions of the constitution requiring the legislature to provide municipal home rule?
provision for a general law for their incorporation was intended to confer upon them almost
exclusive rights in the conduct of their affairs .•••" Village of Kingsford v. Cudlip, 258
Mich. 144 at 148, 241 N.W. 893 (1932).
55 See In re Dodge Bros., 241 Mich. 665 at 669, 217 N.W. 777 (1928).
561 CooLBY, TAXATION, 3d ed., 469 (1903).
572 CooLBY, TAXATION, 4th ed., 1125 (1924).
58 Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353
(1921).
59 Thoman v. Lansing, 315 Mich. 566 at 576, 24 N.W. (2d) 213 (1946).

696

MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw

[ Vol. 52

Considered together with the constitutional requirements, it would
seem fair to suppose that the legislative home rule act should not
be considered or construed as a grant from the legislature to the
municipalities of the state in the traditional sense. The grant is from
the people of the state, assembled in convention, directing that the
legislature establish general rules for the guidance of municipalities
in the exercise of their home rule powers. 60 When municipal activities
are matters of local concern, as municipal finances surely are in at
least some respects, it would appear that the municipalities, in pursuing these activities, are acting in a capacity other than merely
as agents of the state legislature. Rather, they are exercising power
which is, in the absence of conllicting state legislation, sovereign in
their own electors. Even the doctrine of preemption, which is applied
by the courts in Ohio and, by reason of express language of Act 481,
in Pennsylvania,61 cannot be invoked for finding an implied legislative intent contrary to a municipal income tax in Michigan, for the
state (I) does not levy such a tax and (2) has not adopted the preemption doctrine.
The problem here is not one of interpreting the scope of the
power conferred by the constitution, as it is in Califomia62 and
Ohio, but is one of construing the legislative act made under the
authority of constitutional provisions. As to the final determination
of the question·, no conclusive statement can be made, other than to
refer again to the tenor of l\tlichigan decisions which repeatedly say
that the constitutional change in 1908 was to give municipalities more
power than they had had previously. 63 What is the source of this
added power, developing contemporaneously with the constitutional
change, if it is not the 1908 constitution itself? And if that is the
case, what is the :qature of this added power if it is not a constitutional
share of the sovereignty reserved to the people of the state? If this
is true, then, should not the legislative provisions, compelled by the
language of the constitution to effectuate its intent, be construed accordingly?
We now shall tum to a consideration of the home rule act itself.
The home rule act includes both "mandatory" and "permissible"
charter provisions. "Mandatory" provisions must be included in the
60Gallup v. Saginaw, 170 Mich. 195, 135 N.W. 1060 (1912).

Mallison, "Local Income Taxation," II Omo ST. L.J. 217 (1950).
L. REv. 350 (1921) for an interpretation of §§6 and 8 of article XI
of that state's constitution.
63 See Dexter, "Legal Aspects of Local Excise Taxes in Michigan," liNIVl!RSITY OF
61 Fordham and
62 See 9 CALIF.

M:rcmcAN BURBAU oF GoVllRNMENT lNsTITUTB OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PAPERS IN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (No. 2) 67 (1948).
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home rule charter whereas "permissible" provisions are optional and
within the discretion of the electors of the municipality.64
The distinction between mandatory and permissible provisions in
itself might be a clue to interpretation of the legislative intent. It
seems logical to assume that the fact that mandatory provisions are
mandatory discloses an intention on the part of the legislature to treat
the matters so designated as of general concern to the state. Such
provisions therefore are obligatory on the municipality and should be
construed with due regard for the general public interest to which
they refer. On the other hand, permissible provisions are directory
in nature. They concern matters in which the general interest of the
state is not so emphatically asserted. Hence they are in the area of
local concern by hypothesis, are optional, and should be construed in
keeping with the traditional Michigan distinction between matters of
general concern in respect of which the municipality acts as an agent
of the state and matters of local concern in respect of which the
desirability of a larger share of local self-determination is more apparent. Considered in the context of the "general law" form imposed
on the home rule act by the constitution,65 the validity of this interpretation seems, a fortiori, strengthened.
This interpretation also is consistent with the tenor of the provisions found in the home rule act. For example, the act, by a
mandatory provision, authorizes the levying of property taxes. 66 This
seems to demonstrate a recognition on the part of the state legislature
that property taxation will be a part of the scheme of state, county,
and school district taxation in the state as well as that of municipalities
and that a degree of tax coordination with respect to property taxes
is in the general interest of the state. To effectuate this purpose, the
section in question provides that municipal property taxes shall be
levied on the same subjects as are taxed for state, county and school
purposes.67 In support of the proposition that the purpose of the
mandatory provision is to make a degree of tax coordination possible
with respect to the property tax, note that the language of the section,
by its very terms, is directed at making the form of property taxes
actually levied meet certain requirements in regard to the subject
matter and the rates imposed rather than providing that the property
tax itself shall be mandatory as a source of revenue. Presumably the
64Mich. Comp. Laws
6 5 Art. VIII, §20.
66 Mich.

67 lbid.

(1948) §§117 et seq.

Comp. Laws (1948) §ll7.3(a).
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city council could refuse to impose any property tax if city expenses
could be met in some other way.
Having provided a mandatory form for property taxation, the
legislature recognized the desirability of allowing Michigan munici~
' palities a certain amount of discretion in their sources of revenue and
authorized, by a permissible charter provision, municipalities to lay
and collect nonproperty taxes in the form of "rents, tolls, and excises. "68 "Rents" and "tolls" belong to the class of municipal charges
made for specific services rendered by the municipal government.
But what of the meaning of "excise" in this context? Does a
municipality, having included this provision in its home rule charter,
have authority to levy a municipal earned income tax? Or, put in
a different way, does such a tax come within the definition of "excise"?
This question has not yet been answered by the Michigan Supreme
Court, so we shall turn to other sources of definitions of the term.
". . . excises have been said to be taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities, upon licenses to pursue
certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges." Or, "According
to some authorities, they include any taxes which do not fall within
the classification of a poll or property tax." 69
"Taxes fall naturally into three classes, namely, capitation or poll
taxes, taxes on property, and excises. In general, it may be said that
all taxes fall into one or the other of the foregoing classes, any exaction
which is clearly not a poll tax or a property tax being an excise." 70
"It is, however, difficult to arrive at any all-inclusive definition of the
term 'excise tax,' since it has long since been changed from its original
connotation of an impost upon a privilege. In its modern sense an
excise tax is any tax which does not fall within the classification of
a poll tax or a property tax. . . ."71 ''Although there is considerable
confusion on the subject, an income tax is generally regarded as in
the nature of an excise tax, and a distinction has been recognized
between an income tax on one hand and a property tax on the
other."72

68 "Each city may in its charter provide • • . for laying and collecting rents, tolls and
excises••••" Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §ll7.4(i).
69 16 McQmLLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 3d ed., §44.190 (1949).
70 51 AM. }UR., Taxation §24 (1944).
11Id., §33.
72 27 AM. }UR., Income Taxes §2 (1940). "The federal tax, so far as based on the
income from property, is a 'direct' tax as that term is used in the federal constitution; but
a tax on the income from a trade, profession or employment, as distinguished from a tax
on the income from property, is an excise." 4 CooLEY, TAXATION, 4th ed., §1745 (1924).
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There has been no attempt to be exhaustive in the definitions
set out above, nor has any effort been made to show any chronological
development in the meaning of "excise," although such has existed.
As some of the definitions indicate, there has beeri. confusion in the
usage of the term. But it also is clear that some very respectable
authority, especially that which is more recent, supports the inclusion
of "income tax" within the meaning of "excise."
Since good authority does exist for this, the view that the permissible excise provision in a home rule charter should be interpreted
to include an income tax seems a reasonable one. It certainly is
consistent with the "general grant" theory under the home rule act7 8
as well as with the idea that a city charter is to be construed as the
organic law of the city. 74
If "excise'' is interpreted to mean all taxes except property and
capitation taxes, the statutory framework for municipal taxation falls
into a pattern of meaning. Municipalities have been authorized to
levy two of the three great classes of taxes pursuant to the constitutional
mandate to provide for the incorporation of cities by general law:
property and excise taxes. Capitation (poll) taxes have not been
authorized. The effect of the general law would be to authorize
municipalities to levy all taxes, in conformance with the procedural
forms prescribed by statute and constitutional provision, other than
poll taxes for which express authority has not been provided. The
act thus takes on a posture of consistency, and judicial interpretation
would not be difficult.
But what if a more restricted view of the meaning of excise is
taken? First, is such a view consistent with the interpretation that
should be given a statute passed under a constitutional direction?
Second, how would the courts go about determining what is and what
is not an excise? What criteria would they use in view of the confusion that can exist in the definition of the term? Granted that
expediency is not a shortcut to justice, is the problem solved by taking
a position which will inject uncertainty into the area of municipal
taxation by judicial hair-splitting? Or, do hard cases still make bad law?
The Michigan Supreme Court has expressly adopted the broad
definition of "excise" as applied to a state tax-the corporate franchise
fee. 75 The general philosophy of enlarged municipal powers was
1s Gallup v. Saginaw, 170 Mich. 195, 135 N.W. 1060 (1912).
74 Streat v. Vermilya, 268 Mich. 1, 255 N.W. 604 (1934).
75 Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261 at 264, 185
N.W. 353 (1921).
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accepted by the Michigan court in a case dealing with a property tax
limitation.76
There is authority for including an income tax within the meaning
of excise, and this authority becomes more forceful when considered
in the context of the constitutional direction that the legislature provide by general law for the incorporation of cities. Even if these
views of definition and interpretation are not accepted, however, a
tax similar to the one attempted in Saginaw could be sustained on
the narrower ground that it is an occupational excise measured by
income. "An excise upon those engaged in a particular occupation,
although graded in accordance with income, is an occupation tax and
not an income tax." 77 It was for this reason that Louisville and
Paducah (Kentucky) levied occupational excises upon persons earning
income within the city limits rather than the Saginaw type of municipal
income tax.
There is Michigan judicial rationale going to the support, by
analogy, of the proposition that a municipal occupational tax, measured by earned income, is an excise. The state imposes "a specific
tax upon the privilege of ownership of intangible personal property." 78
The measure of this privilege tax is 3 percent of the income produced
by income-producing intangibles, except that the tax is not to fall
below an amount equivalent to 1/10 of I percent of the face, par,
or contributed value of the intangible property concerned. 79 The
court held this tax valid as a specific tax on the privilege of owning
intangible property. In order to avoid the argument that according
to the opinion in the Pollock case80 an income tax is a tax on property
and therefore should be subject to the property tax uniformity clause
in the constitution,81 the court said that "The income basis for measuring the tax does not constitute it an income tax."82 State inheritance taxes, also measured by income, were held to be specific excises.83
A corporate franchise tax is an excise, even though the amount is
measured by the capitalization of the corporation. 84
76 School District of Pontiac v. Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338 at 349, 247 N.W. 474 (1933).
77 4 CooLBY, TAXATION, 4th ed., §1742 (1924). Emphasis supplied.
78 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) p. 3242.
79 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §205.132.
80 Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 15 S.Ct. 912 (1895).
81 Mich. Const., art. X, §3.
82 Shivel v. Kent County Treasurer, 295 Mich. 10 at 19, 294 N.W. 74 (1940). See

Shapero v. Department of Revenue, 322 Mich. 124, 33 N.W. (2d) 729 (1948); Goodenough v. Department of Revenue, 328 Mich. 502, 44 N.W. (2d) 161 (1950).
sa Union Trust Co. v. Durfee, 125 Mich. 487, 84 N.W. 1101 (1901).
84 Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W.
353 (1921).
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Arguing analogically from these state excises, it seems plausible
to suppose that a municipal tax, levied on the privilege of earning
income in the city, could be treated as an occupational excise measured by the income of the persons benefiting from this privilege. Such
a tax would apply to income earned within the city, whether by residents or nonresidents, and would be similar in form to the municipal
income taxes in Kentucky referred to above. It would seem rather
clearly to be authorized by the "permissible" excise enabling provision
of the Michigan home rule act. This type of occupational excise
would differ from Saginaw's proposed income tax in that it would be
applicable only to income earned in the city by residents rather than
to all of their earned income. Its effect on nonresident earned income
would be the same as the Saginaw proposal-limited to income earned
in the city.
In summarizing the conclusions reached on this branch of the
question, we see that there is good authority for saying that an income
tax comes within the scope of the excise classification. This "good
authority" is the weight of modern authority and represents the trend
of the recent cases. In view of the constitutional provisions requiring
the legislature to provide for the incorporation of cities by general
law and the broad interpretation that should be given the "general
law" philosophy of the home rule act by the courts, it would seem
particularly desirable, in this legal context, to define "excise" to include an income tax. Even if this view is not accepted, however,
there is authority for saying that a tax levied on the privilege of earning
income within the city limits and measured by the income earned is
an occupational excise.

VI.

Uniformity and Other Legal Questions

Having concluded that the permissible home rule excise provision
can and should be construed to authorize the imposition of a municipal income tax, we now shall consider whether there are legal
impediments to alter this conclusion.
One of the arguments most frequently made against such a tax
is that it violates the uniformity clause of the state constitution. If
an income tax is considered a property tax on the authority of the
Pollock case, it is assumed that the following provision would prohibit
it: "The legislature shall provide by law a uniform rule of taxation,
except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on
such property as shall be prescribed by law."85
85 Mich.

Const., art. X, §3.
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But should a municipal income tax be considered a property tax
so as to come within this prohibition? No. In the first place, we
already have defined it as an excise under the meaning of the permissible home rule provision.
In the second place, the contemporary authority does not consider a tax on income to be a tax on property. "Although the distinction is sometimes a close one, a tax on an occupation or privilege,
whether it is called a 'license tax,' an 'occupation tax,' or a 'privilege
tax,' is not a tax on property."86 It usually is said that the result in
the Pollock case, can be explained by the provision in the Federal
Constitution that direct taxes must be apportioned among the states
according to population. 87 The Michigan court has stated the rule
that an income tax is not a property tax. "In construing the covenant
it is plain that taxation upon real estate means one thing, and taxation upon income means another."88
'The rule of uniformity is not applicable to specific taxes. License
taxes, privilege taxes, and occupation taxes are specific taxes and
not ad valorem taxes upon property."89
The same rule also has been applied in Michigan to excise taxes
in which the amount of the tax is measured by income. "An income
tax is an assessment upon the income of the person and not upon any
particular property from which that income is derived." 90
Undeniably the line between an ad valorem tax on intangible
property and an excise tax on the privilege of owning such property
is a narrow one, but the courts have had no difficulty in drawing it
in cases involving state taxes. Even narrower, perhaps, is the line
to be drawn between an ad valorem tax imposed on property and
an annual corporate franchise fee measured by the paid in capital
and surplus of the corporation, but the courts also have been able
to draw this line. 91
Both the intangible privilege tax and the corporate franchise fee
86 37 C.J. 171 (1925).
87 U.S. Const., art. I, §2.
88 Park Bldg. Co. v. Yost Fur Co.,
89 C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald,

208 Mich. 349 at 361, 175 N.W. 431 (1919).
270 Mich. 659 at 673, 259 N.W. 352 (1935),
concerning a chain store privilege tax, the amount of the tax being graduated in accordance
with the number of stores owned.
90 Young v. The lliinois Athletic Club, 310 lli. 75 at 81, 141 N.E. 369 (1923), cited
with approval in Shivel v. Kent County Treasurer, 295 Mich. 10, 294 N.W. 74 (1940).
The court concluded that article X, §3 had no application to the tax in question as it
related only to ad valorem taxes. This reasoning was approved in Shapero v. Department
of Revenue, 322 Mich. 124, 33 N.W. (2d) 729 (1948).
9 1 ''That it is not a property tax but is a tax on the franchise to do business as a
corporation within the state is •.• clear." Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Secretary of
State, 216 Mich. 261 at 264, 185 N.W. 353 (1921).
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seem, as a matter of degree, at least as closely akin to an ad _valorem
tax on property as a municipal excise on the privileges of earning
income or living within the city limits. Two distinctions appear between these excises and property taxes, although neither admittedly
is very great. The ad valorem taxes are imposed according to some
sort of valuation of the property, supposedly related to its intrinsic
worth,92 whereas the excises in question are imposed according to
measures, such as income or capitalization, related to but distinct
from the intrinsic value of the property itself. The second distinction is one of form only. The property taxes are imposed directly
on property itself (in theory) whereas the excises are imposed on
privileges related to the ownership or use of property. The tenuousness of this can be illustrated by considering the circumstances in
which a property interest is a privilege and when a privilege is a
property interest.
Conceptual overlapping clearly is possible. The elimination of
both of the narrow distinctions referred to above would be possible
in a hypothetical situation. Suppose the intangibles tax were imposed
on the privilege of owning such property with the rate measured by
the cash value of the property (rather than the income it produces).
What then: an excise or an ad valorem tax? Fortunately this hard
question has not yet had to be answered in Michigan. By eliminating
distinctions of measure and form, the only remaining distinction would
be one of words, i.e., what tag did the legislature attach to the tax?
Since the ultimate distinction in such a hypothetical situation is one
of words only, it would seem that the traditional presumption of
constitutionality of legislative acts would control the court in its
application of conflicting constitutional provisions. As a policy matter,
any tax is, after all, subject to the political restraints inherent in a
representative form of government. When the people elect to tax
themselves in the interest of the public weal, it should, it would seem,
take a clear showing of abrogation of some "fundamental" constitutional concept to induce the court to upset the act of sovereignty reflected in a good faith legislative choice.
When the discussion reaches the point of presumptions, opponents
of a tax will argue that ". . . in case of doubt a tax statute should
be construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and against the municipality."93 But this, it should be pointed out, is a rule pertaining
92 "All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its cash value." Mich.
Const., art. X, §7.
93 16 McQtJILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRAnoNs, 3d ed., §44.13 (1949).
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to ambiguity in tax statutes. We are assuming a case in our hypothetical situation in which the legislative body has authorized "by
clear warranty of the law" 94 a certain· kind of tax to be imposed on
designated taxpayers.
Construed as a specific tax rather than a property tax, article X,
section 4, of the constitution applies to the municipal income tax:
''The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which shall be
uniform on the classes on which they operate." 95 Is a Hat rate income tax uniform on the classes on which it operates? A Hat rate
tax would seem as uniform as a tax on jncome can be.96
Is the classification itself reasonable, or is it a discriminatory
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution? To take an extreme example, if the
tax were levied against just one citizen in a city of 20,000 population,
the classification would fail as arbitrary and capricious. The tax in
question, however, is levied on all earned income in the city and that
earned by residents outside of the city as well. Taken together with
the presumption in favor of the reasonableness of legislation, this
clearly appears to meet the equal protection test as a reasonable
classification.
A more serious problem would arise under the Michigan constitutional provision cited above if the municipality attempted to
impose a progressive tax with the rates graduated according to the
income of the taxpayer. Although several of the states have imposed
such a tax, all municipal taxes, other than that imposed by Washington, D.C., have been imposed at a Hat rate. 97
In the case of a graduated rate, the legal argument for such a
tax centers on the question of whether the setting up of various
income brackets is a reasonable classification under the Michigan
Constitution. 98 Notice again that the only constitutional limitation
is that such taxes be uniform on the classes on which they operate.
This limitation pertains to uniformity only, not classification itself.
94 Id. at
95 "The

pp. 42-43.
only constitutonal requirement applicable to specific taxes is that they shall
be uniform upon the classes upon which they operate." C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270
Mich. 659 at 673, 259 N.W. 352 (1935). See Walcott v. The People, 17 Mich. 68
(1868), for an application of the uniformity clause of the constitution of 1850 to a specific
tax.
96 See Judge Cooley's opinion in Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406 at 414, 20
Am. Rep. 654 (1875).
97 Wisehart, "The Income Tax as a Source of Revenue for Michigan Municipalities,"
UNIVERSITY OF M:rcmGAN BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT lliSTITUTii OF PtmLIC .fu>MINISTRATION, PAPERS IN PuBI.1c .ADMINISTRATION (No. 10) 42 (1954).
98 Art.
§4.

x,
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The only limitation on classification would seem to be the reasonableness test imposed by the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution. It is self-evident, from the graduated rate taxes imposed
both by some states and by the federal government, that this federal
limitation does not prohibit progressive income taxation. For the
purpose of compliance with the Michigan constitutional provision,
it would seem plausible to consider that a separate specific tax is
imposed upon each income bracket at a different rate. In other words,
a graduated rate tax could be argued to be a valid classification by
income in which the rates are uniform within the various income
classifications.
In Union Steam Pump Sales v. Secretary of State, 99 the Michigan
court had the opportunity to consider the uniformity question in regard to an annual corporate franchise fee imposed at different rates
on large and small corporations. The unanimous court, speaking
through Judge Fellows, treated the application of the federal equal
protection and the state uniformity provisions together, saying that
they both have the same legal effect in this regard. The court pointed
out that the problem basically is the same as the taxation of some
property and the exemption of other property.100 It also compared
it to a revenue license fee imposed by the State of Illinois with rates
graduated according to the amount of business done and to inheritance taxes imposed at different rates, both types of taxes having been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.101 In upholding the
Michigan tax, the Court said:
"That absolute uniformity, absolute equality in taxation is
Utopian has long been recognized. That the legislature has
the power to classify has also long been recognized. That it is
the abuse of such power, not its exercise, that is within the
constitutional inhibition, numerous decisions demonstrate."102
From the material considered here, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that a municipal income tax imposed at a Hat rate does
not conllict with article X, section 3 or section 4 of the Michigan
Constitution, and a graduated rate tax, although more doubtful, is
arguably valid as a reasonable classification under article X, section 4.
In order to reach the conclusion stated above, it has been necessary for us to decide that a municipal income tax is not an ad valorem
99 216 Mich. 261, 185 N.W. 353 (1921).
100 See Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229
101 Clark v. Titusville, 184 U.S. 329, 22 S.Ct.

170 U.S. 283, 18 S.Ct. 594 (1898).
102 At pp. 275-276.

U.S. 322, 33 S.Ct. 833 (1913).
382 (1902); Magoun v. Savings Bank,
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tax. This point is important in deciding another question which
challenges the municipal income tax. Mandatory home rule charter
provision "(£)" under the title, "Taxation," states that "the subjects
of taxation for municipal purposes shall be the same as for state,
county and school purposes under the general law."103 It has been
argued that a municipal income tax does not meet the requirements
of this mandatory provision in that the other units of government
named do not impose municipal income taxes.104 The latter part
of the argument is clearly true, for no state, county, or school district
income taxes are imposed in Michigan, but the contention as a whole
avoids the real question: Was the mandatory home rule section in
question meant to apply to excises imposed under permissible charter
provisions, such as the municipal income tax? The answer to this
question seems just as clearly to be no, and for two reasons. In the
:6.rst place, it hardly seems likely that the legislature would have intended to authorize one form of taxation in one part of the home rule
act under the permissible excise provision and then provide in the
same act that such a tax would be invalid unless imposed also by the
state, counties, and school districts. If a conflict does exist in the
statutory provisions, which seems doubtful, then the rule of legislative
interpretation should be applied by which the courts will adopt the
interpretation which gives the greatest effect possible to all parts of
the statute. In the second place, there seems to be no real conflict.
Immediately following the section referred to above is section l l 7.3(g).
First notice that the title to this section is "Same," obviously referring
to the prior title of "Taxation." The provisions of this section, referred to above, pertain only to property tax limitations. Read in
connection with the preceding section, with which it bears the same
title, it becomes manifest that the legislature intended to impose a
mandatory system of property taxation which would provide a measure of tax coordination through the use of uniform tax bases. In view
of this legislative intent, section (f) is meaningful only as applied to
property taxes and does not limit the power by which are authorized
municipalities to levy excises.
The argument also is made that municipalities cannot levy income taxes because, it is urged, the state government does not have
the power to levy such taxes itself and therefore cannot empower
municipalities to do so. Even if this statement that the state lacks
103 Mich. Comp. Laws
104 Brief for Plaintiffs

(1948) §117.3(£).
and Appellees on Appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court,
House and Corson v. Saginaw, pp. 16-18.
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power to levy such a tax be accepted as true, although it can be
questioned in the light of two opinions of the attorney general, limitations on state power to tax in Michigan have been held not necessarily to limit municipal taxing powers.105 This result seems particularly persuasive when considered together with the fact that the
municipal authorization was passed under the direction of constitutional provisions.
It has been argued that the well-known Missouri case of Carter
Carburetor Corporation v. City of St. Louis1° 6 is, analogically speaking,
authority against Michigan municipalities having the power to levy
income taxes. This case involved an action by a taxpayer to secure
a declaratory judgment and injunction on the St. Louis income tax.
The tax itself was similar to the one proposed in Saginaw.
Prior to the imposition of the St. Louis tax, the Missouri court had
held valid a state tax imposed on income.107 The court decided that
a tax on income is not a tax on property so as to bring it within the
prohibition of the uniformity clause of the state constitution, that
uniformity need be only by class, that the state legislature had power
to pass the tax in the absence of an express constitutional limitation,
and that the tax therefore was valid. This answered all of the questions with respect to an attempted municipal income tax in the same
state other than that of whether the municipality had authority to
levy the tax.
The Missouri Constitution provides that "Any city having more
than 10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt a charter for its own
government, consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws
of the state. . . ."108 This was adopted in 1945, but is substantially
the same as the corresponding provision in the 1875 constitution
under which the St. Louis charter was adopted ( except that the latter
constitutional provision applied only to cities over 100,000 rather than
10,000 population). Under this authority, the City of St. Louis had
included in its charter power to "assess, levy, and collect taxes for
all general [and] special purposes on all subjects or objects of taxation."100 In the Carter case, the court held that the municipal income
tax was an excise tax, but said that the city needed specific authorization in order to impose such a tax.110 It did not find the authority
105Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 654 (1875).
10s 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W. (2d) 438 (1947).
107Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 339, 205 S.W. 196 (1918).
10SArt. VI, §19.
100 Art. I, §1(1).
11osee Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W. (2d) 498 (1943).
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required in the charter provision set out above, however, saying that
the residents of the city voting for the charter in 1914 could not have
intended to give the Board of Aldermen "free rein" to impose the
tax in question on them. 111
This interpretation of a home rule charter provision enacted under
such a sweeping grant of constitutional authority perhaps is subject
to criticism. But there are elements in the Missouri situation which
serve to distinguish it from the situation confronting a similar tax
imposed by a Michigan municipality. In the :first place, the constitutional grant itself is not as broad as it might seem from a consideration of article VI, section 19 alone. Article X, section I of the
Missouri Constitution _provides, "The taxing power may be exercised
by the general assembly for state purposes, and by counties and other
political subdivisions under power granted to them by the general
assembly for county, municipal and other corporate purposes." Article X, section 11 (f) adds, "Nothing in this Constitution shall prevent the enactment of any general law permitting any county or other
political subdivision to levy taxes other than ad valorem taxes for its
essential purposes." And, "The term 'other political subdivision,' as
used in this article, shall be construed to include . . . cities . . .
having the power to tax."112 These latter sections, new to the Constitution of 1945, clearly seem to imply that the subject of municipal
taxation is to be treated as of general concern and suggest that the
general grant of home rule powers in article VI, section -19 is to be
quali:6ed by the power of the state legislature in the area of municipal
taxation. By way of contrast, the Michigan legislature specifically
has provided that municipalities may levy excises, a term which, as
indicated above, the Missouri court would construe as including a
municipal income tax. In regard to the construction of the St. Louis
charter itself, it also should be pointed out that state statutes provide
for the levying of municipal ad valorem taxes and that city charter
provisions speci:6cally authorize certain nonproperty taxes, indicating
an intention not to rely on the general charter grant itself for taxing
authority.
Rather than being analogical authority against the imposition of
a municipal income tax in Michigan, the Carter case, because of its
de:6nition of an income tax as an excise, would seem to be good
authority to the effect that Michigan municipalities, acting under
explicit statutory provision, could impose such a tax.
111 At p. 658.
112 Art. X, §15.
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Remaining legal questions are those which have been raised concerning municipal income taxes generally and therefore are not peculiar to the Michigan legal environment. Since they have been
discussed and decided elsewhere, the purpose here is only to refer
to them, their dispositions, and sources of further elaboration.
An Ohio case is authority for the proposition that the imposition
of the Toledo income tax on nonresidents working within the city
limits is not a violation of the due process or equal protection clauses,
even though such nonresidents do not have the opportunity of voting
on the tax. The reasoning is that the amount of tax paid by the
nonresident wage earner -bears a reasonable relation to the benefits
which the taxpayer derives from the city by his employment therein.113 In the same state, minimum income exemptions have been
upheld as a reasonable classification.114
It also has been held that the fact that the withholding provisions
cannot be applied to all taxpayers does not violate a uniformity clause
relating to property taxes.115 As has been indicated, the Michigan
constitutional uniformity provision relating to specific taxes permits
a reasonable classification-apparently one that would meet the requirement of giving equal protection under the law.116
A body of enlightening case law with respect to municipal income
taxes has developed in the Pennsylvania courts. Contrary to the
Ohio experience, a minimum income exemption was held an invalid
violation of the state's constitutional uniformity clause.117 The right
of Philadelphia to tax city and federal employees' income was upheld,
although the city could not force the respective governments concerned to withhold the tax.118 The difference in the tax imposed on
business net income as distinguished from that imposed on the salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation of individuals was
held not to invalidate the Philadelphia tax.119
Because of express statutory preemption given taxes already imposed
by the state, extension of the municipal income tax to reach unearned
11a Angell v.
114 Stockwell

City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E. (2d) 250 (1950).
v. City of Columbus, Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Franklin County,
86 N.E. (2d) 822 (May 23, 1949).
115 Alaska Steamship Co. v. Mullaney, (D.C. Alaska 1949) 84 F. Supp. 561; Reynolds
Metal Co. v. Martin, 269 Ky. 378, 107 S.W. (2d) 251 (1937); Travis v. Yale and Towne
Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 40 S.Ct. 228 (1920).
116 For a general discussion of this whole topic, see Roberts, " 'Pay-As-You-Go' Withholding Under State and Local Income Tax Laws," 5 NAT. TAX J. 335 (1952).
117 Butcher v. Philadelphia, 333 Pa. 497, 6 A. (2d) 298 (1938).
118 Marson v. Philadelphia, 342 Pa. 369, 21 A. (2d) 228 (1941); Philadelphia v.
Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 25 A. (2d) 406 (1942).
119 Dole v. Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 375, 11 A. (2d) 163 (1940).
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and corporate income was held invalid in Pennsylvania.120 This
problem would not concern Michigan municipalities levying income
taxes since there is no statutory preemption in regard to local taxation,
nor has the state adopted the doctrine of implied preemption applied
in Ohio. In addition, Michigan does not impose a state corporation
income tax to which the doctrine of preemption would apply.

VIL Conclusion
The question of whether a Michigan municipality may impose
an income tax under its home rule powers remains unanswered.
Michigan decisions, as well as those from other jurisdictions, offer
good authority for such a tax. From the standpoint of policy alone,
it would seem (1) that municipalities should be encouraged to be
both financially independent and solvent and (2) that the electors
of municipalities should be given a large area of discretion, within
the confines of the general interest of the state, in which to determine their manner of realization of the above objectives.
120 Murray v. Philadelphia, 364 Pa. 157, 71 A. (2d) 280 (1950). For a discussion
of the early legal problems of the Philadelphia tax, see the following article: Green and
Wernick, "The Philadelphia Income and Wage Tax," MUNICIPALrnES AND nm LAw IN
Ac:rr.oN 148 (1944). This article, written by the City Solicitor and the Assistant City
Solicitor of Philadelphia, includes the original city income tax ordinance, the amended city
income tax ordinance, and the income tax regulations, set out in full. This is brought up
to date by Wernick, ''Philadelphia Income and Wage Tax," MUNICIPALrnEs AND nm
LAw IN Ac:rr.oN 148 (1952).

